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Abstract

The National Institute of Standards and Technology introduced a risk management framework
that concludes with a process for continuous monitoring. Continuous monitoring is a way to gain
near real-time insight into the security health of an information technology environment. The
cloud environment is unique from other environments in the way that resources are virtualized
and shared among many cloud tenants. This type of computing has been gaining popularity as a
solution for organizations to purchase resources as an on-demand service in the same way that an
organization purchases utilities today. In order to experience the benefits promised by the
emergence of cloud computing the inherent security challenges in utilizing shared resources must
be addressed. The proposed continuous monitoring program, based on recommendations from
the National Institute of Standards and Technology Draft Special Publication 800-137 (Dempsey
et al., 2010), is intended to address these security concerns. The program specifically addresses
continuous monitoring activities for cloud providers to implement related to configuration
management, patch and vulnerability management, antivirus/malicious software management,
firewall management, and access management. This proposal does not address the shared
responsibilities between the cloud tenant and cloud provider which is recommended as the next
step in this research. The tenant and provider should have complementary controls and
continuous monitoring programs to ensure the security of a cloud solution.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Cloud computing has been gaining momentum over the past decade as a viable option for
enterprise applications. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) describes
cloud computing as a solution for organizations to purchase computing resources on-demand that
can be rapidly implemented with minimal management or service provider interaction (Mell &
Grance, 2009). This definition actually covers many different forms of computing that many are
utilizing today and may not be aware that the foundation is based on cloud models, such as
Google Docs or Facebook.
The cloud model is expected to make computing resources broadly available to small,
mid-sized, and large organizations in the same way that utilities are purchased today. Smith
(2009) suggests that cloud computing will evolve in the same way that electricity generation has
migrated from an internal model a century ago to the service that exists today. The technology
community has already witnessed a similar evolution of services in the telecommunications
industry in the 1990’s (Smith, 2009). Historically, capacity was hard wired between destinations;
but, this design evolved into capacity being managed through Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
that provided a secure path between destinations that was built using many segments (Smith,
2009). This design coined the term “telecom cloud,” which was the first instance of the modern
day term for the cloud model (Smith, 2009). Now, we are experiencing the next evolution in
technology which utilizes a cloud environment for hosting services that are available on an as
needed basis.
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Chapter 2 – Review of Literature and Research
The cloud model can be broken into three major offers: (1) Software as a Service, (2)
Platform as a Service, and (3) Infrastructure as a Service (Mell & Grance, 2009). Software as a
Service (SaaS) provides software applications that are housed in the cloud provider’s
environment that users can access via a thin client, most commonly a web browser (Mell &
Grance, 2009). Platform as a Service (PaaS) provides the ability for consumers to house
consumer-created or acquired applications and deploy in the cloud infrastructure (Mell &
Grance, 2009). In this case the underlying systems and hardware are maintained by the cloud
provider, but the consumer has control over the deployed applications and can also maintain the
environment configurations (Mell & Grance, 2009). PaaS can be used for the entire software
development lifecycle by hosting the development tools in the cloud infrastructure and utilizing
the cloud environment to deploy to users. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) provides fundamental
computing resources to the consumer (Mell & Grance, 2009). This service offers consumers
processing, storage, and network resources that are hosted in the cloud provider’s environment.
Consumers can still maintain access to configure operating systems, deployed applications, and
some networking components (Mell & Grance, 2009).
In addition to the three major cloud environments there are also five key characteristics
that the NIST attribute to a service being considered cloud computing (Mell & Grance, 2009).
These five critical elements define a service as part of the cloud model: (1) on-demand selfservice, (2) broad network access, (3) resource pooling, (4) rapid elasticity, and (5) measured
service. On-demand self-service suggests that resources can be automatically provisioned by the
consumer without requiring manual intervention (Mell & Grance, 2009). Broad network access
is required for consumers to access the platform using a multitude of devices (Mell & Grance,
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2009). Resource pooling refers to the basic concept of cloud customers sharing resources that
grow and shrink automatically, in some cases, based on demand, known as rapid elasticity (Mell
& Grance, 2009). The last characteristic and arguable the most important element of this shared
resource space is ensuring that the service being provided can be monitored, controlled, and
reported (Mell & Grance, 2009). Measured services indicate that metrics must accompany the
solution that is provided to customers; but metrics are also useful for the provider to adequately
operate the cloud environment.
Lastly, the cloud model is described by four types of deployment methods: (1) private,
(2) public, (3) community, and (4) hybrid. A private cloud can be hosted by a third party
provider or managed internally and is intended for use by a single organization (Ryan &
Loeffler, 2010). A public cloud deployment is hosted by a third party provider and can
experience the greatest financial benefits since it is shared by many customers (Ryan & Loeffler,
2010; Mell & Grance, 2009). The community cloud can be shared by multiple organizations that
are connected in some way; the NIST provides potential threads of connection as “mission,
security requirements, policy, and compliance considerations” (Mell & Grance, 2009). Lastly,
the hybrid model is a combination of two or more deployment methods described above (Mell &
Grance, 2009).
Cloud computing is gaining momentum as a viable option for many types of enterprise
applications. It provides a solution for organizations to purchase computing resources as an ondemand service in the same way that an organization purchases utilities today (Talbot, 2010;
Anthes, 2010; Goodburn & Hill, 2010). Organizations have been driven to take a closer look at
incorporating the cloud model into the overall business strategy due to the many substantial
benefits that could be gleaned by making the move. These benefits have been described in many

CONTINUOUS MONITORING

4

different ways, but seem to fall into the following categories which will be described in more
detail below.
(1) Cost savings to the organization
(2) Increased productivity
(3) Simplified Information Technology (IT) management
(4) Refocus on core competencies
Cost Savings to the Organization
First and foremost, an organization can see cost savings simply by not hosting these
technology resources on-site. Smith (2009) indicates that by using a third party cloud provider an
organization will avoid the added cost of providing an adequate environment for technology
equipment. Traditionally, the facility hosting business critical resources would require increases
to the electrical system, isolated floor space, modifications to regulate the air conditioning, as
well as staff to manage the technology program (Smith, 2009). The core function of cloud
computing, as the NIST’s definition confirms (Mell & Grance, 2009), is that resources are elastic
(Owens, 2010). This characteristic of the cloud provides a major savings for organizations as
they only need to purchase what they need when they need it. Rather than purchasing resources
to support peak times that only last a portion of the year, the organization only pays for increased
computing resources during those peak times when needed. Smaller organizations that may just
be getting off the ground can forecast expected computing needs, but if those forecasts are too
high or too low this elasticity feature will allow their customers to remain unimpacted.
Increased Productivity
The cloud model allows organizations to respond to changes and be more agile when
making decisions that support their business. This increased flexibility enables organizations to
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respond to market changes faster and easier than traditional technology environments (Goodburn
& Hill, 2010). The ability to implement change rapidly within an organization provides the
opportunity to capitalize on market shifts immediately and as a result experience an increase in
productivity (Goodburn & Hill, 2010).
Simplified IT Management
Two views can be explored relative to the simplification of IT management: first, from
the perspective of a small to mid-sized business; and second, from the perspective of a large
organization that does not specialize in technology management. The cloud model provides a
small to mid-sized business with access to “the same technology infrastructure and support as a
Fortune 500 company” creating a huge advantage today over conventional IT models for these
companies (Goodburn & Hill, 2010). In many IT departments today technology associates are
spread so thin that there are few opportunities to become an expert in a specific technology.
Large organizations can also see the benefits from this simplified IT management structure by
capitalizing on the knowledge and experience of the cloud community (Goodburn & Hill, 2010).
Both small and large organizations will be able to take advantage of the growing competition
between cloud providers and have the opportunity to move to a provider if needs are not being
met (Smith, 2009).
Refocus on Core Competencies
Organizations should be focused on fulfilling their primary business function, not on
becoming experts in managing IT resources. Goodburn and Hill (2010) emphasize that the cloud
allows organizations to reconnect with their core competencies and redirect resources from
managing internal technology to focusing attention on their primary business objectives. This
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ability to “outsource” these technical responsibilities frees employees to attend to “other aspects
of their work that could otherwise have been neglected” (Cloud Computing, 2009).
The Security Risks
In order to experience the benefits promised by the emergence of cloud computing the
inherent security challenges in utilizing shared resources must be addressed. The cloud
infrastructure is based on the virtualization of processors, networks, and disk drives which allow
multiple users to run concurrently on a single physical server (Talbot, 2010; “Hypervisor,”
2011). However, it has been demonstrated that services running on a single piece of hardware
has an increased potential for the system to be compromised which is explored further in the
following two examples.
The first example is presented by Owens (2010) as a vulnerability that was identified in
November 2009 that allows a user to traverse from one virtual machine client environment to
another client environment managed by the same hypervisor. Owens (2010) further emphasizes
this security vulnerability specifically in relation to elasticity; one of the basic functions of cloud
computing that allows users to grow and shrink resources on-demand. This highlights this
vulnerability given a public cloud model and the lack of user control over where data may be
physically stored (Owens, 2010).
The second example presented by Talbot (2010) is regarding sharing hardware between
multiple cloud customers. Researchers have demonstrated that an attacker can successfully steal
data using an eavesdropping program when two programs are running in parallel on the same
operating system (Talbot, 2010). Talbot (2010) then suggests that this same kind of attack could
penetrate a cloud environment when virtual machines run on a single server. Anthes (2010)
confirms Talbot’s claim by referencing a successful side-channel attack using virtual machines
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located on the same hardware that was conducted by computer scientists at University of
California and MIT.
These examples highlight the fact that security risks are currently the barrier for
widespread adoption of cloud computing for mission critical applications and data (Chen,
Paxson, & Katz, 2010; Kontzer, 2010). In addition, data is not the only security concern for
organizations in the cloud. Chen et al. (2010) also identifies activity patterns as a vital asset that
must be protected; activity patterns could be visible to other users sharing the same resources.
The recommendation of this study is for cloud providers to address security concerns via a
continuous monitoring program that is consistent with the recommendations included in NIST
Special Publication 800-37, Revision 1 (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST],
2010).
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Chapter 3 – Methodology

The Risk Management Framework (RMF) described in NIST Special Publication 800-37,
Revision 1, is a framework that is intended to improve information security and strengthen the
risk management process within federal agencies (NIST, 2010). The RMF is a six step process
that defines risk related tasks that are to be executed during the system development life cycle, or
against legacy systems if applied as a gap analysis (NIST, 2010). It provides guidance on how to
maintain effective security controls despite constant changes in the internal and external
environment while still allowing a high degree of flexibility to be exercised in implementing the
process (NIST, 2010). This flexibility is what contributes to the effective application of this
process within non-government organizations.
The last step, step six, in the RMF describes the security control monitoring process
coined continuous monitoring (NIST, 2010). “Continuous monitoring is a proven technique to
address the security impacts on an information system resulting from changes to the hardware,
software, firmware, or operational environment” (NIST, 2010). Using the concept of step six in
addition to the controls identified in Special Publication 800-53 Recommended Security
Controls, continuous monitoring guidelines have been provided for a cloud environment to
provide adequate security for itself and its tenants (Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative,
2009).
The goal of the continuous monitoring program within the cloud environment is to
provide a clear picture of security on a near real-time basis. This program delivers consistent
monitoring via automated tools with built-in steps for external review and testing to ensure that
the controls are working as expected. This also provides tenants, or potential customers, of the
cloud environment to remain confident in the security framework that the cloud provider offers.
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A grid of the continuous monitoring recommendations is captured in Appendix A. Ultimately,
this program is intended to help all parties manage risk within the environment and maintain the
highest level of availability (Dempsey et al., 2010).
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Chapter 4 –Results
Configuration Management

Configuration Management tends to be an area that experiences significant volatility and
is a foundation for the need for continuous monitoring activities (Dempsey et al., 2010). The
main components of managing configuration settings are to (1) document the baseline
configurations, (2) identify/control necessary changes to the baseline, (3) implement
configuration changes, and (4) monitor the configuration settings against the baseline (Johnson,
Dempsey, Ross, Gupta, & Bailey, 2011). Each of these components are critical to maintaining
security requirement baselines within the cloud environment.
Baseline configurations are documented when the security-focused configuration
management (SecCM) program is first introduced or a new system is being introduced into the
existing environment (Johnson et al., 2011). Automation tools like ServiceNow can help manage
the baseline creation and storage (ServiceNow, 2011). The baseline configurations will include
all systems (hypervisor, workstation, server, firewall, router, database, etc.) within the cloud
architecture (Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, 2009). Each system baseline will
contain security requirements, at a minimum, for the operating system, applications, current
versions, patch versions/service packs, model, hardware specifications, and location within the
architecture (Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, 2009). Using an application like
ServiceNow provides a streamlined tracking system when issues are identified (incident or
problem) to the correction activity (change request) (ServiceNow, 2011). This type of system
distributes the information gathering activities, rather than managing it all within the Information
Technology team, and creates a well-rounded inventory of changes.
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As updates are made to systems, after testing and approvals are secured, the baselines are
simultaneously updated using the change request information. The Change Management team is
responsible for managing this continuous updating process. The Change Management team will
work with the Patch and Vulnerability Group when they acquire, test, and distribute patches to
the organization. Those systems that are customer impacting will include an additional
communication step to update the customer of such changes. The Information System Security
Officer is responsible for this communication.
Real-time monitoring of baseline security requirements is accomplished using an
automated tool that can monitor the system infrastructure against baseline configurations to
confirm compliance. The Network Administration team is responsible for this monitoring. Alerts
are built in to notify the team of non-compliance indicating that remediation is necessary.
Baseline security requirements will also be reviewed semiannually to ensure that the
configuration is appropriate. Reports are pulled from the automated tools and reviewed by the
Network Administration team, Information System Security Officer, and Security Control
Assessor.
Patch and Vulnerability Management
The Patch and Vulnerability Group (PVG) manages the patch and vulnerability program
(Mell, Bergeron, & Henning, 2005). With an enterprise patching solution in place it allows the
PVG to “automatically push patches out to many computers quickly” (Mell et al., 2005). Having
standardized system configurations provides an environment that is consistent from a
maintenance standpoint but also makes testing patches much more streamlined and ultimately
more successful (Mell et al., 2005). It is recommended to have as few system images as possible
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to better maintain each variation and reduce the amount of testing and potential issues that can
arise with non-standard system configurations.
The risk assessment policy is an input for this PVG team to operate effectively. In
accordance with RA-1 the risk assessment policy and procedures must be documented and
include roles and responsibilities, coordination between organizational entities, required
compliance, and above all contain the appropriate level of leadership support (Joint Task Force
Transformation Initiative, 2009). Having this policy in place provides the framework for how to
address issues as they arise. It instructs the PVG and its leadership on what types of risks fall
outside of the organizations risk tolerance. This policy need not be a separate document but must
be addressed in order for this team to be effective.
This patch management program is applicable to all cloud models - SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS.
Patches for the following are considered in scope for this program: Operating Systems, Client
Applications, Server Applications, Enterprise Firewalls, Enterprise Network Intrusion Prevention
Systems, Enterprise Antivirus and Antispyware Software, and Security Applications. In order to
stay apprised of the constantly shifting security environment an enterprise patch management
tool is utilized to obtain all available patches from supported vendors (Mell et al., 2005). Nonsupported vendor patches are managed individually and are tracked using a separate system
inventory.
A patch management tool, like IBM Tivoli Endpoint Manager, is utilized to capture
updates automatically for supported vendors (IBM Corporation, 2011). The following are
vulnerability management resources that are utilized as sources of timely information on security
threats and for non-supported vendor patch information. In addition, vendor websites are
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manually reviewed to ensure all applicable patches in the environment are reviewed on a
monthly basis.
Table 1: External Vulnerability Resources
Source Name

Source Location

Description of Use

US-CERT

http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/

A shared PVG email address is used to

National Cyber

manage updates from the National Cyber

Alert System

Alert System. The PVG group will manage
this mailbox daily and compile any updates
that have not been captured via the patch
management tool.

US-CERT

http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/

Vulnerability

To help determine the priority of patches
based on the cloud environment.

Notes Database
Open Source

http://www.osvdb.org/

Review manually daily. The PVG group

Vulnerability

will compile any updates that have not

Database

been captured via the patch management
tool.

SecurityFocus

http://www.securityfocus.co

A shared PVG email address is used to

Vulnerability

m/vulnerabilities

manage updates from SecurityFocus. The
PVG group will manage this mailbox daily

Database

and compile any updates that have not been
captured via the patch management tool.
System

www.sans.org/sac

Review manually daily. The PVG group
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Administration,

will compile any updates that have not

Networking, and

been captured via the patch management

Security Institute

tool.

(SANS Institute)

All applicable patches are reviewed by the PVG on a daily basis. This review will consist
of reviewing the patch management tool updates, the PVG mailbox updates, and the additional
external vulnerability resources listed in Table 1. Once the vulnerabilities have been captured
that apply to the cloud environment the PVG will then assess whether there are redundant
patches and remove any duplication until they are left with a complete list of new vulnerabilities
that apply to the environment. Lastly, the PVG team will determine the risk level of the
vulnerability using a calculation of how many systems / users are impacted, how the
vulnerability can be exploited, and the potential result if the vulnerability is exploited
(Brykczynski & Small, 2003). This provides the PVG with the risk level of the vulnerability that
has been identified in order to evaluate it against the stated organizational risk tolerance. These
steps help the PVG determine the priority of each patch and whether the emergency patch
process should be initiated.
The PVG will determine the testing schedule for the recommended changes based on the
prioritization determined in the previous steps. Testing within a non-production environment is
required for all patches prior to being deployed to the production environment to reduce the
impact to cloud tenants. Once testing is completed a phased approach is used to apply to
production starting with the least impacted areas first (Network World Staff, 2008). This
provides the PVG an opportunity to evaluate and measure the impact of the update prior to
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releasing to the entire impacted environment. Non-critical patches are released into production
weekly using scheduled downtime that clients can anticipate and plan around (Thurman, 2006).
This release schedule is published and released to cloud tenants on an annual basis. Any
adjustments to this schedule are communicated to the tenants by the Information System Security
Officer.
All system images that are used within the environment will also require updates to
ensure that newly deployed equipment is up-to-date. All images are updated on a quarterly basis
and all equipment released during that time will have updates pushed prior to deployment
(Thurman, 2006). In addition, any vulnerability that is identified that does not have a patch
developed is assessed for immediate configuration changes based on the risk assessment. This
gap should follow the same emergency process as high risk vulnerabilities that have patches
available (Mell et al., 2005).
An emergency process is in place to address and deploy critical patches in the
environment immediately. The PVG reviews the patches that have been released and identifies
any patches that require immediate action due to the vulnerability putting the organization
outside of its risk threshold. This is determined using the risk assessment process defined in the
risk assessment policy. The patch, or patches, that fall within this recommendation are fully
documented by the PVG and presented to the Configuration Management Board which consists
of the Information System Owner, Authorizing Official, and Senior Information Security Officer
who will evaluate for immediate mitigation. These high risk vulnerability patches must be
installed as soon as possible, but no later than 24 hours after the initial notification of the
vulnerability.
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The patch management tool will also be used to continuously monitor system compliance
to ensure that all patches are implemented successfully and remain up-to-date. In addition, a
semiannual review of the patch and vulnerability management program is conducted by the
Configuration Management Board in coordination with the PVG. This certifies that the approach
within the cloud environment still meets the needs of its customers. During this review, metrics
are used to indicate the effectiveness of the program. The data points reviewed will cover
susceptibility to attack, mitigation response time, and cost (Mell et al., 2005).
Patch management is a critical component to ensuring that systems and applications don’t
have exposed vulnerabilities. An example of how to confirm that patches are installed and
vulnerabilities mitigated within the environment can be found in Appendix B. However, patch
management is often a time consuming endeavor that requires appropriate testing prior to
implementation. This lag time provides an opportunity for that vulnerability to be exploited prior
to the patch getting implemented. Mell et al. (2005) emphasize that the time between a
vulnerability being published and the release of malware developed to exploit the vulnerability
has significantly reduced to weeks or even days. Given that our program is to capture new
patches daily but implement non-critical, or lower risk, patches weekly creates risk in the
environment. In this case, we will rely on additional controls to detect and stop malware prior to
patches being deployed.
Antivirus / Malicious Software
Antivirus software is the key mitigating control that exists to catch known threats or
infections prior to patches being installed (Mell et al., 2005). Least privileges are implemented to
ensure that only a limited group of users have administrative access on servers, network devices,
and desktop / laptops (Mell et al., 2005). Implementation of this control limits the effectiveness
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of malware to exploit vulnerabilities since it typically requires administrator access to deploy
(Mell et al., 2005).
Antivirus software typically uses two main techniques for identifying malicious software
(malware), signature dictionary and suspicious behavior (Weaver, 2007). As malware is detected
antivirus developers update the dictionary of known virus signatures. According to Mell et al.
(2005) “major antivirus vendors usually release signatures for a significant new threat within
several hours.” In this way clients receive signature updates frequently to ensure that known
malware is identified and either deleted or quarantined (Weaver, 2007). The second approach is
to monitor system activities and identify when certain behaviors appear suspicious (Weaver,
2007). This is done via heuristics techniques that assess files for suspicious code sequences or by
looking for irregular activities when running the file in a virtual machine (Mell et al., 2005).
Antivirus software is installed on all systems that support the cloud services. The
application settings are owned by the PVG and individual operators will not be able to make
updates to the configuration or disable the service. Similar to the patch and vulnerability
management program, centrally managed antivirus software, like Symantec Protection Center
and Symantec Endpoint Protection, is utilized to acquire, review, test, and deploy signature
updates (Symantec Endpoint Protection, 2011). Antivirus software should have various modules
to address modern threats. The Symantec Endpoint Protection family covers the standard
elements that should be addressed in a cloud environment by combining antivirus, antispyware,
desktop firewall, intrusion prevention, device and application control, and network access control
into a single agent (Symantec Endpoint Protection, 2011). The following are some specific
features that should be included, whether the Symantec product or another application is
implemented:
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Protection against viruses, worms, Trojan horses, spyware, bots, zero-day threats
and root kits (Symantec Endpoint Protection, 2011; Mell et al., 2005);

(2)

Rules-based firewall engine, browser protection, Generic Exploit Blocking shields
(Symantec Endpoint Protection, 2011);

(3)

Real-time activity monitoring;

(4)

Scan storage (local and removable) weekly (Mell et al., 2005).

The cloud environment will house a minimum of two antivirus servers that are used for
managing client software and distributing updates (Mell et al., 2005). These servers will have
unrelated operating systems to reduce the impact of an attack against these servers. If one is
taken down due to a targeted attack all servers won’t be impacted (Mell et al., 2005). Staying
consistent with the patch and vulnerability management program, all images are updated with
current antivirus software versions and signatures on a quarterly basis and all equipment released
during that time will have updates pushed prior to deployment. In addition, the centralized
antivirus software management console will provide reports to determine any systems that are
out of compliance and require updating or manual intervention. The PVG will monitor this report
daily and address issues within 24 hours. Appendix B provides an example of how to confirm
that antivirus signatures are installed and up-to-date within the environment. Global issues are
escalated to the Senior Information Security Officer and the Risk Executive for mitigation plan.
Firewall Management
Firewalls are implemented to separate system and network environments within the
cloud. This allows the cloud provider to offer more secure environments potentially for a private,
community, or hybrid cloud deployment model that requires additional segregation of systems.
Firewalls are configured to work with a set of rules to determine what network traffic is
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acceptable and will be permitted (Mell et al., 2005). A network-based Intrusion Prevention
Systems (IPS) is incorporated into the firewall to provide layers of protection at the perimeter
and between network environments. An IPS is used in place of an Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) due to its ability to not only perform up-front identification of an attack but it will also
attempt to stop or block the attack that is detected. IDS technology will detect the attack but will
not take any counter measures against it. The network-based IPS monitors network activity and
detects irregular deviations from the baseline activity (Mell et al., 2005). These systems work
together to determine what to allow or disallow into the network (Mell et al., 2005).
The necessary firewall and IPS patches are managed via the patch management process.
However, there are other continuous monitoring activities that must be maintained to effectively
manage the firewall and IPS solution (Scarfone & Hoffman, 2009). Performance of the firewall
is critical and is monitored every hour. Alerts are configured to send an email to the Network
Administration team when the performance strays from baseline. This alert is configured to send
an email to the shared Network Administration mailbox in addition to mobile devices to ensure
that the alert is responded to immediately. Monthly and year-to-date performance logs and
reports are reviewed on a monthly basis by the Network Administration team, Common Control
Provider, Information System Owner, and Senior Information Security Officer.
The firewall policy guides the set of rules that the firewall uses to direct incoming and
outgoing network communications. Over time these policies will require adjustments to
accommodate environmental changes or as a result of a new threat(s) (Scarfone & Hoffman,
2009). Changes can be introduced as needed to accommodate new products or services required
within the organization. When changes of this kind are requested a complete impact assessment
is conducted to ensure that changes don’t impact other policies or rulesets already in place. This
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assessment is driven by the Common Control Provider who will work with the Network
Administration team, Information System Owner, and Senior Information Security Officer.
An emergency process is in place to address and deploy critical firewall updates to the
environment immediately. The Network Administration team reviews the changes that are
needed that require immediate action due to the vulnerability putting the organization at risk.
This is determined using the risk assessment process defined in the risk assessment policy. The
adjustments that are needed that apply for this emergency process are documented by the
Network Administration team and presented to the Common Control Provider, Information
System Owner, and Senior Information Security Officer. This team will evaluate the required
change and determine the impact to the existing ruleset and configuration in place. This team
indicates if there are any dependencies for the change and provides approval to implement.
These changes will be implemented in production as soon as possible, but no later than 24 hours
after the initial change notification.
Review of the firewall policies and rulesets is assessed quarterly, independent of changes,
to ensure that all are still necessary and none are inadvertently missing. The review is conducted
by the Common Control Provider, Network Administration team, Information System Owner,
and Senior Information Security Officer. It will cover the complete assessment of the current
state, any changes that occurred since the last review, who made the changes, who approved the
changes, and what triggered the change (Scarfone & Hoffman, 2009). A complete policy and
ruleset review is conducted by the Authorizing Official on an annual basis to confirm that the
rules are appropriate and align with the organizations goals (Scarfone & Hoffman, 2009).
Since it is expected that firewall policies and rulesets change over time it is critical to
keep frequent backups (Scarfone & Hoffman, 2009). Backups are scheduled monthly and are
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completed and stored by the Network Administration team. Backups will also be taken prior to
any changes being implemented to ensure that if a rollback of changes is necessary that it’s
accessible for immediate return to normal. The Common Control Provider will log all policy and
ruleset decisions that are implemented.
In addition to maintaining the firewall configuration and assessing annually to validate
that they support the goals of the organization, it is also important to confirm that the rules are
complete and perform as expected. Therefore, penetration testing is scheduled semiannually to
evaluate the overall security of the network. This is performed by a minimum of two associates
on the Network Administration team with the oversight of the Information System Owner and
Senior Information Security Officer. The schedule for this test is kept confidential to get a true
simulation of network security. Appendix B also provides an example of how to confirm that
firewall configuration working as expected within the environment.
Access Management
Managing operator access within the cloud environment is an essential control that limits
access to only authorized users and distinguishes between functional responsibilities. An
application is used for access requests that has a built in workflow component to automate the
approval process prior to access being fulfilled. Aveksa is one example of a system that provides
self-service to the user that requires access as well as workflow that facilitates human resource
(HR) and organization management approval and then sends the access request to the
Information Security Administration team for provisioning (Aveksa Inc., 2011). When HR
provides approval for an employee to become active in the system the request will then route to
the manager to ensure that the access is appropriate for the role of that individual.
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Separation of duties must be maintained in order to thwart insider threats. The concept of
separation of duties is a security principle with the primary objective of preventing fraud and
errors by implementing a two-person integrity control (Humphreys, 2008). In the cloud
environment it is crucial “that no single employee is in a position to introduce fraudulent,
malicious code or data without being detected” (Humphreys, 2008). Role based access (RBAC)
will be used in order to maintain this separation. RBAC essentially means that a role, or a
collection of access entitlements, is assigned to a user based on their function within the
organization (Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, 2009). In the cloud environment the
administrative functions will be segregated using roles to reduce the likelihood of an individual
having significant access that could individually compromise the system or tenant data.
Consistent with AC-5, the Separation of Duties control, the following support functions
will be segregated using roles: systems management, systems programming, configuration
management, quality assurance and testing, network security, and database security (Joint Task
Force Transformation Initiative, 2009). These roles will be enforced to ensure that no individual
will perform the other’s responsibilities or have access to system layers that is outside of the
stated function.
Roles are configured with a focus on separation of duties. They are defined by the
Information System Security Officer and Information System Owner to ensure that they do not
violate the separation of duties rules that have been defined within the cloud environment. The
Information System Security Officer and Information System Owner will not have access to
make updates to the role privileges. Roles are defined by the Information System Security
Officer and Information System Owner and will require approval from both individuals prior to
any changes being introduced to these roles. Approval will be submitted in the form of a change
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request via a change management tool, like ServiceNow (ServiceNow, 2011). The Information
Security Administration team is responsible for creating and updating the entitlements within
each role. This is a manual layer of control that will limit any updates to the roles that may
contradict the separation of duties rules defined.
Reporting and logs are used to monitor activities within the system to ensure that no user
is performing functions outside of their role access. This automated control is continuously
monitored on a daily basis to ensure that these barriers remain intact. If the separation of duties
rules are violated an alert will be sent to the Information Security Administration team and the
Information System Security Officer for immediate review, root cause assessment, and
remediation. Additional teams, like the Network Administration team, will be a part of the
review and root cause analysis as needed. In addition, semiannual reviews of the roles will be
conducted to recertify that the roles in use are appropriate. This review also assesses any changes
to the environment and determines if the roles are still sufficient or if adjustments are necessary
to retain complete separation of duties. Reviews will be conducted by the Information System
Security Officer, Information System Owner, Senior Information Security Officer, and Risk
Executive.
If an employee changes job function, HR notifies the Information Security
Administration team. The Information Security Administration team then requests a
recertification of access to the employee’s new manager. If approval to retain access is not
received the Information Security Administration team will revoke access. If the Human
Resources system is not integrated with the access provisioning system, termination notices are
submitted daily to the Information Security Administration team in order to completely revoke
access. Terminations are processed within the same day. An entitlement review is initiated using
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an automated tool, like Aveksa, each quarter to validate the active users in the system as well as
individual user entitlements (Aveksa Inc., 2011).
Using an automated tool for managing operator accounts and operator entitlements
provides an audit trail to support future audit requests to ensure that all access provisioned was
appropriate. Organization Managers will review the active account report quarterly to ensure that
the accounts are appropriate. Operator entitlements will also be reviewed by the Organization
Manager to validate that the user is serving in the function that the role and access provisioned is
appropriate for. Testing a sample of user access requests to validate that the process is working
effectively is done on an annual basis by the Information System Security Officer and Security
Control Assessor. Reports will also be produced to track the speed that system access has been
revoked when no longer needed. These reports are reviewed on a quarterly basis by the
Information System Security Officer, Security Control Assessor, and Information Security
Administration team to confirm that the process is working effectively and in sync with the
entitlement review process.
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Chapter 5 – Conclusions

The cloud environment is unique in the way that there is shared responsibility to maintain
effective security controls and ensure that there is limited security exposure. Tenants will be
responsible for a piece of the security puzzle and must be accountable for a portion of the
security controls and continuous monitoring. “Cloud Providers and Cloud Consumers collaboratively
design, build, deploy, and operate cloud-based systems. The split of control means both parties now share
the responsibilities in providing adequate protections to the cloud-based systems” (Liu et al., 2011). The

next step in this research is to determine what a continuous monitoring program looks like for the
cloud tenant to complement the cloud provider’s continuous monitoring program (Liu et al.,
2011).
Cloud providers, like Amazon, have internally developed tools that are used for
monitoring and security related activities (Amazon Web Services, 2011). This proprietary
development has some pros and cons for the cloud model and for its customers. One of the
benefits is that there can be a custom integration process for managing the security within the
unique cloud infrastructure. This can lead to a higher level of service for the tenant and allows
the cloud provider to provide a high level of security and availability. A drawback to this internal
development is the lack of public awareness for vulnerabilities that may exist. It can also mean
that the systems may not hold to industry parity over time. Internal development is known to be
more costly and given increased competition in the cloud sector it may become challenging for
the cloud provider to maintain the highest quality of security in the long term.
This program should be implemented in a cloud environment to understand the full
benefits of the proposed continuous monitoring program. This program is intended to provide a
mature security infrastructure that the cloud provider can maintain and communicate to
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customers. A high level of transparency is required between the cloud provider and its tenants in
order for the program to be successful given the unified nature of the cloud environment.
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Appendix A
Continuous Monitoring Grid

Category

Control

Configuration Management Review Baseline
Configuration for Real
Time Compliance
Review Baseline Security
Requirements

Patch and Vulnerability
Management

Antivirus / Malicious
Software

Continuous
Monitoring
Frequency
Daily

Roles Responsible

Network
Administration team

Semiannually Network
Administration team,
Information System
Security Officer,
Security Control
Assessor

Capture New Patches

Daily

Patch and
Vulnerability Group

Review New Non-Critical
Patches

Daily

Patch and
Vulnerability Group

Implement Patches that
require Server Reboot
System Compliance with
Patch status
Emergency Patches

Weekly

Patch and
Vulnerability Group
Patch and
Vulnerability Group
Patch and
Vulnerability Group,
Configuration
Management Board

Daily
As Needed /
within 24
hours of
notification

Maintain Patches on
Images

Quarterly

Review Overall Patch and
Vulnerability Program

Semiannually Patch and
Vulnerability Group,
Configuration
Management Board
Quaterly
Patch and
Vulnerability Group
Daily
Patch and
Vulnerability Group
24/7/365
End Point
Application

Maintain Signatures on
Images
Manage Compliance with
systems
Real-time activity
monitoring

Patch and
Vulnerability Group
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Full System Scanning

Weekly

Corporate Wide Signature
Updates

Daily

Firewall Performance
Real-Time Monitoring

Hourly with
Alerts
configured
Monthly

Firewall Performance
Management - Reporting

Firewall Policy and
Ruleset Maintenance

As Needed

Emergency Firewall
Policy and Ruleset
Changes

As Needed /
within 24
hours of
notification

Log Policy and Ruleset
Changes

As Needed

Review Firewall Policy
and Ruleset

Quarterly

External Review Firewall
Policy and Ruleset

Annually

End Point
Application
Patch and
Vulnerability Group,
Antivirus Central
Management Console
Network
Administration
Network
Administration,
Common Control
Provider, Information
System Owner,
Senior Information
Security Officer
Common Control
Provider, Network
Administration,
Information System
owner, Senior
Information Security
Officer
Network
Administration ,
Common Control
Provider, Information
System Owner,
Senior Information
Security Officer
Common Control
Provider
Common Control
Provider, Network
Administration,
Information System
Owner, Senior
Information Security
Officer
Authorizing Official
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Policy and Ruleset Backup

Monthly / As
Needed

Penetration Testing

Semiannually Subset of Network
Administration team,
Information System
Owner
As Needed
Information Security
Administration team
As Needed
Information System
Security Officer,
Information System
Owner, Information
Security
Administration team
Daily
Information Security
Administration team,
Information System
Security Officer
Semiannually Information System
Security Officer,
Information System
Owner, Senior
Information Security
Officer, Risk
Executive
Daily
Human Resources,
Information Security
Quarterly
Organization
Manager
Quarterly
Organization
Manager
Annually
Information System
Security Officer,
Security Control
Assessor
Quarterly
Information System
Security Officer,
Security Control
Assessor,
Information Security
Administration team

Access Provisioning
Role Changes

Separation of Duties
Monitoring

Role Review for
Separation of Duties

Termination Fulfillment
Active Account Review
Operator Entitlements
Testing Access Process

Report Metrics for Access
Revocation

Network
Administration team
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Appendix B

Example Control Enforcement
Patch and vulnerability management example.
Confirming that a remediation has been successful and the vulnerability has been
mitigated is an important step in the patch and vulnerability management process. One way to
provide assurance that patches have been installed as planned is to perform a network scan with a
vulnerability scanner (Mell et al., 2005). “A vulnerability scanner identifies no only hosts and
open ports on those hosts, but also associated vulnerabilities” (Mell et al., 2005). These systems
use databases of vulnerabilities which must be updated frequently so that it can identify the
newest vulnerabilities (Mell et al., 2005). This program recommends weekly patch
implementations. Vulnerability scans are conducted post patch implementation to ensure the
remediation was successful. Logs will be reviewed from the vulnerability scanner to identify any
false positive results. Notations must be made in the change management tool to indicate that the
patch implementation was successful and attach the log files as evidence. The change request
cannot be completed until this confirmation step has been completed.
Antivirus / malicious software example.
Confirm that antivirus signatures are installed and up-to-date within the environment in
addition to the managed enterprise application monitoring real time. Reviewing antivirus logs
can provide details on update failures and other indications of outdated signatures and software
(Scarfone, Souppaya, Cody, & Orebaugh, 2008). Logs are reviewed weekly by PVG and
Information System Security Officer. Using an automated audit tool to review the logs and
provide a specific view on the information needed to confirm that the environment is in
compliance with the appropriate antivirus definition files with less effort than reviewing
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manually (Scarfone et al., 2008). This summary view produced by the audit tool can also be
shared with cloud tenants and auditors as evidence that antivirus program is effective.
Firewall management example.
Confirm that firewall policy and rulesets are configured within the environment and are
working as expected. Reviewing firewall and IPS logs can provide details on the traffic that is
being allowed into the network (Scarfone et al., 2008). Reviewing these logs can identify issues
with the current firewall configuration if traffic is coming through the firewall that should be
disallowed based on the policy (Scarfone et al., 2008). Using an automated audit tool to review
the logs and provide a specific view on the information needed to confirm that the environment
is in compliance with the appropriate policy and rulesets with less effort than reviewing
manually (Scarfone et al., 2008). This summary view produced by the audit tool can also be
added to the inventory to confirm that the baseline configuration is in place and working as
expected.
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Glossary

Term
AWS
Community

Definition
Amazon Web Services
An environment shared by many organizations in
particular industries, by geography, along similar
supply chains or otherwise connected. Establish
cooperation between suppliers, providers,
customers.
Cloud infrastructure shared by several
organizations that support a specific community
that has shared concerns. The shared concerns
could be the mission, security, privacy, policy, or
regulatory compliance

DoS
DDoS
HR
Hybrid
Hypervisor

IaaS

Denial of service
Distributed denial of service
Human Resources
Involves a composition of two or more of the
three preceding models.
In computing, a hypervisor, also called virtual
machine monitor (VMM), is one of many
virtualization techniques which allow multiple
operating systems, termed guests, to run
concurrently on a host computer, a feature called
hardware virtualization.

IDS
IPS
IT
PaaS

Cloud Infrastructure as a Service. Storage,
processing, and network services.
Intrusion Detection System
Intrusion Prevention System
Information Technology
Cloud Platform as a Service. Development,
testing, deployment, hosting, and maintenance
services.

NIST

National Institute of Standards and Technology
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Cloud deployment model: a “closed”
environment for a single organization hosted by a
third party.
Maintain all the technology components, servers,
and software for a single organization. The
solution may be managed by the user or a third
party but is provided for the benefit of only one
organization. Private clouds are increasingly
being deployed within larger enterprises.
A shared environment used by many
organizations.

PVG

Available to anyone or to large industry groups
and is owned by the provider of the service.
Offers the greatest potential flexibility and
savings but also involves granting the service
provider the greatest control over the enterprise’s
technology capabilities. Large enterprises are
using this deployment for discrete services and
are evaluating ways to further use the model.
Patch and Vulnerability Group

RBAC

Role Based Access

Risk

Risk is a measure of the extent to which an entity
is threatened by a potential circumstance or
event, and a function of:
(i) the adverse impacts that would arise if the
circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the
likelihood of occurrence.

SaaS

Cloud Software as a Service. Web application
usage services.
Security-focused configuration management
IaaS, PaaS, SaaS
Terms of Service

SecCM
SPI Models
ToS
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The simulation of the software and/or hardware
upon which other software runs.

